Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

The State of Utah v. Christopher Cheeney : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Kevin Murphy; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Kennth R. Updegrove; Deputy Salt Lake
District Attorney; attorneys for appellee.
Linda M. Jones, Rebecca Hyde; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Cheeney, No. 950720 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6944

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF

U^AH

"-i-KMi_a

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS K ^ ' ] J 1 V 1 B N I T

$±-1
•A10

STATE OF UTAH,

DOCKET NO. 3507

20-a

Case No. 950720-CA

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
Priority No. 2
CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY,
Oral Argument Not Requested
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

DEFENDANT'S APPEAL OF ENHANCED PENALTIES FOR ACTING IN
CONCERT WITH TWO OR MORE PERSONS, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3203.1 (1995), IMPOSED UPON CONVICTIONS FOR BURGLARY, A THIRD
DEGREE FELONY, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (1995), AND THEFT, A
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6^04 & 76-6-412
(1995 & SUPP. 1995), BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT
LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK,
PRESIDING.
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
LINDA M. JONES
REBECCA HYDE
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee

FILED
APR - 2 1996
COURT H P ADDCAI

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 950720-CA

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Priority No. 2

CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY,
Oral Argument Not Requested
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

DEFENDANT'S APPEAL OF ENHANCED PENALTIES FOR ACTING IN
CONCERT WITH TWO OR MORE PERSONS, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3203.1 (1995), IMPOSED UPON CONVICTIONS FOR BURGLARY, A THIRD
DEGREE FELONY, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (1995), AND THEFT, A
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-404 & 76-6-412
(1995 & SUPP. 1995), BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT
LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK,
PRESIDING.
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
LINDA M. JONES
REBECCA HYDE
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF
APPELLATE REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT
I.
THE "IN CONCERT" ENHANCEMENT STATUTE DOES NOT
CREATE A NEW CRIMINAL OFFENSE; INSTEAD, IT IS A
LEGITIMATE SENTENCE ENHANCER THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE
FULL TRIAL RIGHTS IN ITS APPLICATION

7

A.

Section 76-3-203.1 Does Not Create a New Offense

B.

Section 76-3-203.1 Requires Only the Minimal Process that is Due for
Sentencing Proceedings

15

C.

Section 76-3-203.1 Does Not Deny a Preliminary Hearing

17

JJL

SECTION 76-3-203.1 IS NOT VAGUE, PROPERLY PRESERVES
JUDICIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION, AND DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE FIRST AMENDMENT

19

A.

The Statute is Not Vague

19

B.

The Statute Legitimately Permits Limited Judicial Discretion in its
Application

21

The Statute Does Not Impair First Amendment Rights

23

C.

i

9

m.

CHEENEY CANNOT PROVE THAT SECTION 76-3-203.1 VIOLATES
EQUAL PROTECTION OR "UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS"
PRINCIPLES

CONCLUSION

26

ADDENDA
Appendix

24

I - Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1
("In Concert" Sentence Enhancement)

Appendix n - Cheeney's Trial Court Memorandum
Appendix HI - Waiver of Preliminary Hearing

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Dawson v. Delaware. 503 U.S.

, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992)

23

Pennjs v, United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)

23

Gravned v. Citv of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104 (1972)

19

McMillan v. Pennsylvania. 477 U.S. 79 (1986)

passim

Proffitt v.Florida. 428 U.S. 242 (1976)

15

Schall y, Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)

23

Specht v. Patterson. 386 U.S. 605 (1967)

17

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)

7

Wavte v. United States. 470 U.S. 598 (1985)

22

Wisconsin v.Mitchell.

10

U.S.

, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1991)
STATE CASES

Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991)
Nephi City V, Hansen, 779P.2d673 (Utah 1989)
Salt Lake Citv v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994)
State v, Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994)

16
2
21
13, 14

State and Graham v. Pavne. 892 P.2d 1032 (Utah),
cert, denied,

U.S.

, 116 S. Ct. 178 (1995)

State v. Anderson. 632 P.2d 877 (Utah 1981)

14
16

State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991)
iii

6, 20, 23

State v. Bell. 754 P.2d 55 (Utah 1988)

15

State v, Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989)

2, 6, 14, 19, 22, 25

State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990)
State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991),
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992)

6, 24

14

State v. Carter. 888 P.2d 629 (Utah),
cert, denied,

U.S.

, 116 S. Ct. 163 (1995)

14, 15

State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982)

16

State v. Clark. 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 1981)

25

State v. Davis. 787 P.2d 517 (Utah App. 1990)

2, 7

State v. Geer. 765 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1988),
cert, denied, 113 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989)

22

State v. Gerrish. 746 P.2d 762 (Utah 1987)

22

State v. Harris. 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978)

15

State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993)

15

State v, Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988)

6

State v. Lopez. 850 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994)

6

State v. Lovell. 758 P.2d 909 (Utah 1988)

22

State v. Mohi. 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995)

2, 25

State v. Moore. 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989)

8, 12, 14

State v. Murphv. 674 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1983)

23

State v. Peterson. 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984)

21

State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)

7
iv

State v. Sanwick. 713 P.2d 707 (Utah 1986)

16

State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 OJtah App. 1988)

3

State v. Wedge. 293 Or. 598, 652 P.2d 773 (1982)

16

DOCKETED CASES
State v. Rasmussen. No. 950521-CA (Br. of Appellant filed 23 February 1996)

3

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. Amend. I

23

U.S. Const. Amend. XTV § 1

24

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Cal. Penal Code § 186.20 (West Supp. 1996)

11

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1995)

12

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1995)

12

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1995)

22

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995)

passim

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995)

14

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995)

14

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1

16

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1995)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995)

1

v

Utah Const. Art. I § 24

24

Utah R. Crim. P. 4

19

Utah R. Crim. P. 11

3

Utah R. Crim. P. 22

16

Utah R. Evid. 104

4

Utah R. Evid. 1101

15

vi

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY,

:

Case No. 950720-CA
Priority No. 2
Oral Argument Not Requested

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Christopher Cheeney appeals the enhanced penalties imposed upon
his convictions for burglary, a third degree felony, and theft, a second degree felony. The
underlying convictions, plus the enhancements, for "acting in concert with two or more
persons," permitted under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), were entered upon guilty
pleas in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, presiding. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The first and third issues identified by Cheeney are closely intertwined.
Therefore, the State combines those issues as the first point on appeal, and identifies all issues
as follows:

1. Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), which enhances penalties for
certain crimes committed in concert with two or more persons, a legitimate sentencing statute,
which does not require that full trial-type procedures be followed in order for the enhancement
to apply?
2. Does section 76-3-203.1: (a) give adequate notice of the situations in which
enhanced penalties may apply? (b) legitimately allow trial court discretion to suspend the
enhanced penalties? (c) honor First Amendment "association" rights?
3. Does section 76-3-203.1 comply with federal equal protection and state
"uniform operation of laws" constitutional requirements?
The foregoing questions, involving the constitutionality of a statute, are subject
to appellate review without deference to the trial court's rulings. Nephi City v. Hansen, 779
P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1989). However, statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality;
doubts are resolved in favor of validity. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995); State
v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1990). See also State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397
(Utah 1989) (statutes must be construed to comply with constitutional framework).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The challenged sentence enhancement statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1
(1995) is copied in appendix I of this brief. The various constitutional provisions and statutes
invoked by Cheeney are copied in addendum B to his brief of appellant. Other pertinent
provisions will be set forth as necessary in the text of this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
f ^eney and two codefendants were charged with four counts of burglary and
four COU .

uuua •

criminal information setting forth 'those charges, r-u ^ *ie served notice of intention to request
sentence eidiaiiceiQnits under Utah Code Ann. § ' u - . - ^ ,

necause several of the

charged offenses wen n onmiillnl ill i mm n l w if

- 'i& (R. 9-10).

Enhancements for "in conce-

"ink

section 76-3-203

enhancements, * although the statui.

tie cmmonly called "gang

_ „ IL .

Cheeney waived his preliminary hearing (R. 4, 2J-24), and was bound over to
district court ^ t re h plea bargain, Cheeney pleaded guilty — ~me each of the burglary and
theft charge

m sent, Cheeney

reserved the right to challenge the const
appeal (R. 36). See'Sta**"
/

ne "in concert" enhancement statute on

c

iiuvcu LU auiKc action 76-3-203.1 as

unconstitii itunul (R 40, 42-48) Upon ni > in w of the parties' memoranda, the trial court
deni*
senttiiwn5

II^OLIAAI5

iivm, wi^eupon the wouii ~:—

-^LX-Z^J

IU concurrent

enhanced terms

of three to five years on the burglary and six to fifteen years on the theft charge. Those

x

One of the codefendants, Bryan O. Rasmussen, is similarly challenging the
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203.1 on appeal, pursuant to a conditional guilty
plea. State v. Rasmussen, No. 950521-CA (Br. of Appellant filed 23 February 1996)

sentences were imposed consecutively to sentences that Cheeney was already serving for prior
offenses (R. 91-94).2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The burglaries and thefts were committed at several Salt Lake City businesses in
autumn of 1994 (R. 8-12). The crimes appear to have been systematically planned, for some
of the stolen property was cached in a storage unit rented to one of Cheeney's codefendants
under a false name (R. 12). Cheeney confessed his involvement to a law enforcement officer,
and also identified his co-perpetrators (R. 12). When he pleaded guilty, Cheeney admitted that
he committed the crimes in concert with two or more other persons (R. 125), thereby
admitting the factual predicate for the section 76-3-203.1 "in concert" sentence enhancement.
On appeal, Cheeney pursues his challenge to section 76-3-203.1.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The "in concert" enhancement does not create a new substantive offense; nor
does it for any reason require full trial-type procedures in order to apply. When compared
with a similar statute that was upheld against a similar "due process" challenge by the United
States Supreme Court, section 76-3.203.1 also passes constitutional muster. Nor does the
statute require a mens rea beyond that required for guilt of the predicate offenses to which it
applies, as demonstrated by a pair of Utah Supreme Court cases; even if such mens rea did
apply, proof of same would not require full trial-type process. The statute only requires the
degree of process that is due for sentencing hearings, which was provided in this case.
2

Cheeney committed the burglary and theft while on probation for the prior offenses
(R. 139-40).
4

Cheeoey's claim that the statute denies a preliminary hearing on the "in concert" enhancement
fails

eney expressly waived his preliminary hearing. Further, reasonable reading

of the S*

...- _. enhaiicemcNl tan he addiessul ;il 111 crlii*------• ^ ' » n n g .
Section IV/-J-203.1 also is not unconstitutionally vague. ^_„jney's vague. .

claim fails in part due to waiver It otherwise fails because it is based upon an inappropriate
attempt lo grail legislative* hi, umi y mm rnr ^ f u m r n nrn irr 1 ni ifIT h n v r history is Improper
because the statute is unambiguous on its face

v :

there merit to ( hm»ey s contention that

section 76-3-203,1 grants too much discretion to ::iw .^iiicn^mg ,uugt
appropriately cabins the judge's discretion,
man*

three »<**«,** X^JLIIIUIII

also supports the validity of s e c t o r ^6 3-20?. 1. And section

7:> > _•

ass

-

• .

•

- s,

the statute does not reach any constitutionally protected conduct f instead, its appik aiu • is
limited only to criminal behavior.
F!-

mu umiuim opeiaiiun ui iaws"

argument fails because Cheeney did n :: m :: it z than n :: iiiinally invoke the pertinent constitotional
provisions in his trial couiI t'jallciiyt: (j --.J|J

"" '

,l111 l

l

•, ' flu .uguiiieof w n e

preserved, it would fail because it relit* U^A,** ^ ^ W ^ v i n i s e s about the meaning of the statute
and the procedures that are required to implement it, Also, the statute creates no
constitnlmiulh " s u ^ i n l ' i I issificatior •" ' il1 y,t
statutory classiln ill II ins rise to a level I

,,y

iiiffVrenti,!] (i cat nit1 iif between Ihc
;

w

need only rationally advance a legitimate pul

ant scrutin)

liii li nl lliii nutute

i concert" enhancment

satisfies this requirement by more severely punishing group-committed crime, because such
crime causes more harm than solo crime.
ARGUMENT
Overview: Parameters of Review for
Cheeney's Constitutional Challenges
Cheeney raises numerous constitutional challenges to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.1 (1995), the "in concert" enhancement statute under which he was sentenced. Several
principles guide the State's response to Cheeney's arguments.
First, arguments not made in the trial courts, even constitutionally based ones,
are waived on appeal absent a showing of "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances." State
v. Lopez, 850 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26
(Utah App. 1991). Similarly, arguments that Utah courts should depart from federal
interpretations in analyzing claims under analogous state constitutional provisions are also
waived if such arguments were not articulated in the trial court. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d
1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990). In this
case, Cheeney has failed to preserve some of his constitutional challenges altogether.
Additionally, Cheeney's trial court memorandum supporting his motion to strike the "in
concert" statute (R. 41-48, copied in appendix II of this brief), articulated no reason to
interpret Utah constitutional provisions differently from their federal analogues. Therefore,
his arguments under such provisions are governed by federal constitutional law.
Next, statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, and will not be
stricken unless proven invalid beyond reasonable doubt. State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397-98

6

(Utah 1989); State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1990). Accord McMillan v.
Pinsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (state latitude to decide substantive and procedural
Oil.

.

burden i« ~,

^

'-•.

*•

'

~ - , ^ vuiw~ - i^utute is attacked ^ ' *. uliy unconstitutional rather than

unconstitutional as applied in the case at bar

Afii is J : Ii • llenge requires proof that no

Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 466 (Utah App,), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). In this
Cheenev argues broadly that the "in concert" enhancement is unconstitutional, indicating
fee i.i. * i utnuiiL.

S.

POINT ONE
THE "IN CONCERT" ENHANCEMENT STATUTE DOES
NOT CREATE A NEW CRIMINAL OFFENSE; INSTEAD, IT
IS A LEGITIMATE SENTENCE ENHANCER THAT DOES
NOT REQUIRE FULL TRIAL RIGHTS IN ITS APPLICATION
In his first challenge to the "in concert" enhancement statute, Cheeney argues
tf
whic
(Br. of Appellant ai

turns-jur\ tna
_

-. ;

n. and -o on-

y

iyi\ ( knit v .ngiu.s ili.H i w n il

sentencing provision, section 76-3-203.1 nevertheless requires a hearing at which full trial
rights are honored (Br. of Appellant at 31-36). Because both challenges really assert identical

7

contentions about the procedures that must be followed for the statute to apply, the State
addresses them together.
Except for his invocation of Utah's distinctive state constitutional right to a
preliminary hearing, which will be separately discussed, Cheeney's argument is based upon
federal and state "due process." The relevant federal due process case is McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, All U.S. 79 (1986). In McMillan, the United States Supreme Court rejected a
constitutional challenge to Pennsylvania's "firearm enhancement" statute, which provides
enhanced penalties upon conviction of certain predicate crimes when the sentencing judge,
unaided by a jury, finds that the defendant "visibly possessed afirearm"while committing the
crime. The Court also held that visible firearm possession under the enhancement statute only
requires proof by the "preponderance of evidence" standard. 477 U.S. at 91-92. The Utah
Supreme Court has approvingly cited McMillan in a case upholding another type of sentence
enhancement statute. See State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1989) (approving
enhancement for dealing drugs within 1000 feet of a public school). Utah's "in concert"
statute, challenged by Cheeney, similarly enhances the sentence for certain enumerated crimes
committed "in concert with" two or more other persons, as found by the trial court after the
defendant is found guilty of the predicate crime(s).
Under McMillan, this Court should reject Cheeney's argument that full trialtype procedures and proof burdens are required under Utah's statute. As for Cheeney's
complaint that section 76-3-203.1 denies a preliminary hearing on the "in concert"
enhancement, Cheeney waived that complaint when he waived preliminary hearing.

8

A

U I 2(11 ( Ihrt-s I l»LI CwMv n Nm Offnisc

"," I i

Cheeney's argument dial the "in conceit" statute creates a new offense cannot
prevail, Cheeney's primary argument is fataII „i II "i 11 I because he uses ti^ desired conclusion
«u >ut 2>ueh constitutional s a ^ - i r d s as

mp\a\m il*^t iV ^ «- ;
ptionofinno

L. proof beyond reasonable doubt, MK) trial b\ a n

type safeguards, nowever, onlv mu^i .

/ section

offense. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91-93 & n . o

\XWJW/

1 ri -c ;<' '
M .. u .-e

(once a d

*it is properly

adjudged guilty, trial-type safeguards do not apply at sentencing).
1

- • - ^o-

3-203.1 does not prove 'that the statute creates a substantive offense, as Cheeney argues. Quite
the contrary, the lack of such safeguards is consistent with iln u.^isLuuiu's express statement,
~ "j

ii

*

* vv not create ~v separate offense but
T ^f ** t.an 4"7 U.S. at 84-86, a

provides an enhanced penalty tor the
similar disclaimer in the rem;,
process review. And while the Court iii M^M^

*l*# t

C4WXVJ.1V/ TT 1 V U C . W U

^iai a situation nught arise

erein due process law would require a court to disregard a statutory disclaimer of intent to
cre.t
turt-v of Pei

rf

Supreme Court's holding that it does not create a su>
trial-f) pe procedures in • :: i dei to appl;;

n: statute supported the
„ Jense, or otherwise require

I hose featui es ai e shai ed by Utah's "in concei i

statute. Like till: .• : 1 < • • „ • i i 1 \ »raiiia statute, McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87. Utah's section 76-3-203.1

subsection (4). Like Pennsylvania's statute, 477 U.S. at 87, section 76-3-203.1 creates no
defendant-adverse presumptions; instead, the prosecution must first establish guilt of the
predicate crime, and then prove the "in concert" factor. Like Pennsylvania's statute, 477 U.S.
at 87-88, Utah's statute only raises the minimum punishment for the predicate offenses, as set
forth in subsection (3); it does not raise the maximum punishment above the normallyprescribed ranges.
Finally, just as Pennsylvania's statute requires consideration of firearm
possession as a traditional crime "instrumentality'' factor at sentencing, 477 U.S. at 89,
section 76-3-203.1 merely specifies consideration of one of the many "circumstances of the
crime" that traditionally are considered in criminal sentencing. A crime committed in conceit
with others is legitimately viewed as a more serious circumstance, warranting greater
punishment than a solo crime. The logic of this is straightforward: a group-committed crime
is apt to do more damage. Group-committed crimes of every sort, from assault to vandalism,
cause more harm and distress than solo crimes. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell,

U.S.

, 113

S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1991) (it is permissible to enhance penalties for crimes "thought to inflict
greater individual and societal harm"). In this case, for example, it can readily be inferred
that aided by his co-perpetrators, Cheeney was able to steal more property more quickly than
he could have by acting alone. Therefore, just as the federal Supreme Court upheld the
enhancement statute in McMillan, so too should this Court hold that Utah's section 76-3-203.1
creates no new offense, but instead is a valid sentencing statute.
Nor does Cheeney's recitation of section 76-3-203.Ts legislative history prove
that the statute creates a separate offense. All that recitation demonstrates is that the statute
10

arose from t onrern ahnui "pfiiii1 related" crimr and WHS initially modelled upc -

- v

f

.

"anti-gangw statute (Bi of \A

\ • 14) In (In i. ml, the Ui; I111 I ; ', i! ,re exprt

decliii !;:! • ;:i t :> create any new sub

ve crime, and as Cheeney demonslralc1. |Ui of Appellant

at 12-14), crafted a statute that i* mau^uly different from the California provision. In fact,
Utah's section 76-3-203.1 co V v :i :• rfc rence to "uaimji." Compare Cal. Penal Code §§
1K6 2llliiiouLi»Ii

"K iWesI S.

"street gangs," m ith apparent creation ol ireeslanding substanti *e offense with its own
punishment in subsection 186.22(a)).
At best rhivw y' i hislnm i\\ \n iliifioii men \\ ill mnnstrah"; Ihnt thi1 Utah
legislature might have responded t
legislature cons

: . • ne m \^ ^ *i\*. ; v aeMh
.:-..:^ ~

:. ... _

he
.. .

simply enhance the penalties for certain offenses committed by 'three or more persons.
Cheeney makes no argument that the federal or state constitution prohibited that choice To
the i onliaiy miilri hit Mi

i v i i pinpn '
_._0

ion 76-3-203,1 creates a substantive offen se

because it requires proof of the two elements that traditionally constitute tht a,
crirn

riminal act (actus reus) and a criminal mental state (mens rea'

' '2 nrt:r::!rriy

contends that section 76-3-203 1 contains a mens rea element (Br of Appellant at : *•

3

It is irrelevant that California's "anti-gang" statutes withstood the constitutional
challenges that concerned the Utah legislature when it enacted section 76-3-203.1 (Br. of
Appellant at 12). Utah is not required to march lockstep with California's legislative choices.
See McMillan, All U.S. at 90 & n.7 (constitutionality of legislation is not governed by
whether a majority or minority of states adopts similar legislation).
1! 1

Again, his argument is illogical. If section 76-3-203.1 defined a crime, then it would normally
require a mens rea of at least recklessness. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-501, 76-2-102
(1995) ("act" and "mental state" elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt; required
mental state is at least recklessness unless otherwise designated in definition of offense; strict
liability offenses must be expressly so designated). However, as already explained, the statute
by its own terms does not define a crime, and under McMillan, that disclaimer is legitimate.
Therefore, the statute does not and need not include a mens rea.
Citing nonbinding sister state authority, Cheeney argues that "in concert"
includes a mens rea of "purpose," "conscious action," "intent," or "knowledge" to commit
the predicate crime with other persons (Br. of Appellant at 17). However, two Utah Supreme
Court cases, read together, reject Cheeney's effort to engraft a mens rea element into the
statute, and convert it into one that creates a substantive offense. First, in State v. Moore, 782
P.2d 497 (Utah 1989), the supreme court rejected a due process-based challenge to a statute
that enhanced the penalty for illegal drug dealing when committed within 1000 feet of a public
school. The "within 1000 feet" element was a strict liability provision, requiring no
knowledge of a school's proximity. 782 P.2d at 504. Upholding the enhancement, the court
observed that the predicate offense of drug dealing included a mens rea element. Therefore,
there was no due process bar against enhancing the sentence based upon the "proximity"
finding, with no additional mens rea determination: "Utah law does not require that the
aggravating element be accompanied by a mens rea. Therefore, [the statute], which eliminates
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lack of knowledge about the aggravating factor's presence as a defense for the enhanced
penalty, does not violate due process." Id. at 505.
Second, in State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994), the court implicitly
rejected the proposition that in order for Utah's "in concert" enhancement to apply, the
defendant's actions in concert with others must be attended by any mens rea besides that
required for the predicate offense-in that case, intentional murder. Defendant Alvarez argued
that in order for the enhancement to apply, those with whom he had acted must necessarily
have also acted intentionally. The supreme court expressly rejected that argument, holding
that Utah's rules for party liability, incorporated into subsection 76-3-203.1(b) of the
enhancement statute, do not require an identical mens rea among the criminal actors. 872
P.2d at 461. Because the evidence supported a finding that the others who acted with
defendant Alvarez all possessed some level of criminal mens rea, the court upheld his
enhanced sentence. Id. at 462.
The court in Alvarez then observed that the defendant himself had been found
guilty of the predicate offense, which required a "knowing and intentional" mens rea. Id.
That observation implies a determination that the defendant's mens rea for the predicate
offense is the only mens rea that the defendant must have in order for the "in concert"
enhancement to apply; he or she need not have an additional intent to commit the offense with
others. That determination is consistent with the court's earlier holding in Moore: so long as
the predicate offense with its requisite mens rea is established, an additional "enhancer" or
"aggravator" does not require proof of an additional mens rea element.
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Therefore, section 76-3-203.1 requires no additional proof of Cheeney's mens
rea. He admitted a criminal mental state when he pleaded guilty to the predicate offenses of
burglary and theft ("intent to commit a felony or theft," burglary, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(1995); "purpose to deprive," theft, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995)). Under Moore and
Alvarez, no further proof of mens rea was required to enhance Cheeney's sentence under the
"gang enhancement" statute.4
Even if this Court accepted Cheeney's argument that the "in concert"
enhancement requires a separate mens rea from the predicate offense, it would not follow that
such mens rea can only be found by full trial-type procedures. Not every fact inquiry in a
criminal proceeding requires a jury, or proof beyond reasonable doubt. McMillan, All U.S.
at 92-93. Criminal courts routinely find facts necessary for the admission of evidence without
jury assistance, and by proof standards below the "reasonable doubt" standard. See, e.g.,
Utah R. Evid. 104 (facts supporting admission of evidence). The facts thus found include
assessment of a person's mental state. See, e.g., State v. Carter 888 P.2d 629, 641 (Utah)
(determination that confession is voluntary; preponderance of evidence standard), cert, denied,
U.S.

, 116 S. Ct. 163 (1995); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467-68 (Utah App. 1991)

(voluntariness of search consent), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). Some facts in
criminal proceedings must be found by the court, not by jury. State and Graham v. Payne,
892 P.2d 1032 (Utah) (facts to decide criminal jurisdiction), cert, denied,

4

U.S.

, 116

It is also this Court's duty to construe statutes in a way that avoids constitutional
problems. State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). Cheeney invites this Court to add
elements to the "in concert" statute in order to create constitutional problems. This Court
should decline.
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S. Ct. 178 (1995). Therefore, even if "in concert" encompasses a mens rea, this would not
convert the enhancement into a separate offense, nor otherwise require full trial-type
procedures in order to validly apply.
B.

Section 76-3-203.1 Requires Only the Minimal Process that is Due
for Sentencing Proceedings.
Because section 76-3-203.1 is a sentencing statute only, the procedure by which

it applies is relaxed; put another way, far less "process" is "due" for sentencing than for trial
on a substantive criminal charge. This is so because once found guilty, the defendant's liberty
can legitimately be restricted to the degree normally prescribed for his or her offense.
McMillan, 411 U.S. at 91-93 & n.8. Noncapital sentencing within an offense's prescribed
range is traditionally a matter of trial court discretion; procedurally, little more than notice and
opportunity to be heard is required. See State v. Bell 754 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988)
(sentencing under "minimum mandatory" statutes entails a relatively informal procedure);
State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1978) ("the basic provisions afforded by our law to
persons accused of crime do not exist in the same manner after he has been convicted").
There is no constitutional right to sentencing by jury. Prqffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252
(1976). The rules of evidence do not apply; only "reasonably reliable and relevant
information" is required. State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) (quoting
authority); Utah R. Evid. 1101(b)(3); Carter, 888 P.2d at 646 n.20.
Only minimum procedures, to assure fairness and reasonable exercise of trial
court discretion, are required at sentencing. An informal hearing is held; defendant has a right
to be present and a right to counsel. Any written reports, such as presentence reports, must be
15

disclosed so that the defendant can challenge any information contained therein. However, the
author(s) of such reports need not appear unless specifically called by a party, and if personal
safety concerns warrant, the identity of sentencing informants may be withheld. State v.
Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986); State v. Anderson, 632 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1981);
State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982). By statute and rule, the defendant may
give his or her own statement, and present evidence in mitigation of sentence. See generally
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(5) through -(7) (Supp. 1995); Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).5
By no stretch of imagination can Utah's "gang enhancement" statute be viewed
as denying the foregoing sentencing procedure. In fact, that procedure was followed in this
case. Cheeney had a sentencing hearing (R. 131-44). Aided by counsel, Cheeney challenged
portions of the presentence report (R. 133-34), and cited his intelligence level and his troubled
psychiatric history in mitigation (R. 136-37). He was invited to personally address the court
(R. 138-40). Cheeney did not contest the "in concert" factual predicate for the section 76-3203.1 enhancement, probably because he had already admitted it when he pleaded guilty (R.
125). However, through counsel he did urge that he had not been the "ringleader" in the
burglary and theft, thereby at least tacitly requesting that the court suspend the enhancement as
permitted under subsection 76-3-203.1(6). Finally, the imposed sentences did not exceed the

5

Cheeney's citation of Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) (Br. of
Appellant at 34-35), addressing state constitutional due process in parole hearings, cannot be
read as expanding due process rights at judicial sentencing. State v. Wedge, 293 Or. 598, 652
P.2d 773 (1982) (Br. of Appellant 35-36), holding that the factual predicate for applying a
firearm enhancement must be decided by full trial-type proceedings, runs counter to McMillan
(1986) on state constitutional grounds. Therefore, Wedge and other Oregon cases could only
serve as weak justification for a departing analysis under the Utah Constitution~an analysis
that, as already explained, Cheeney has not preserved for appeal.
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zero-to-five and one-to-fifteen basic sentences for the pleaded-to third and second degree
felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1995): he received a six-to-fifteen year
sentence on the greater charge, concurrent with the three-to-five years enhanced sentence on
the lesser (R. 91-94). Therefore, not only does Cheeney's facial due process-based attack
upon section 76-3-203.1 fail; he does not even mount a plausible "as applied" challenge.
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), relied upon by Cheeney (Br. of
Appellant at 32-33), does not demand a different result. As the Supreme Court explained in
McMillan, All U.S. at 88-89, Specht involved a state sentencing scheme that allowed a
sentencing court to increase a guilty defendant's maximum ten-year sentence to indefinite
imprisonment up to life, based only on a presentence psychiatric report, without notice or
meaningful hearing. As just explained, in this case Cheeney had a sentencing hearing at which
he challenged the State's evidence and made his argument for leniency. Therefore, this case
does not even come close to suffering the due process deficiency that existed in Specht.6 In
sum, Cheeney's due process-based challenges to section 76-3-203.1 all fail.
C.

Section 76-3-203.1 Does Not Deny a Preliminary Hearing.
The State finally addresses Cheeney's argument that section 76-3-203.1 denies

his distinctive state right, under article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution, to a preliminary
hearing (Br. of Appellant at 21-22). Cheeney's argument founders, most fundamentally
because he was not denied a preliminary hearing; instead, he affirmatively waived his

6

Further, as explained earlier, Cheeney's sentence was not increased above the
normally prescribed maximums for his predicate offenses. Therefore, Specht is
distinguishable both by process and outcome from this case andfromMcMillan.
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preliminary hearing (R. 4, 23-24, copied in appendix HI of this brief). By its very terms,
article I, section 13 permits such waiver (quoted in Br. of Appellant at 21). Having thus
exercised his constitutional option to waive preliminary hearing, Cheeney can only speculate
that had a preliminary hearing been held, he would not have been allowed to challenge the
State's evidence, or to introduce his own evidence, relevant to the "in concert" enhancement.
In other words, Cheeney again fails to demonstrate an "as applied" constitutional defect in
section 76-3-203.1. And because he has not shown an unconstitutional application of the
statute to him, Cheeney cannot prove that the statute is facially unconstitutional.
Nor could he make such proof in any event. On its face, the statute appears to
allow an "in concert" inquiry at preliminary hearing. Subsection (2)(b) of the statute permits
post-preliminary hearing amendment of the criminal information to add the enhancement.
That permission, however, is contingent upon adequate prior notice of the "in concert"
allegation, or upon determination that the defendant will not be prejudiced by the amendment.7
By implication, if those conditions are not met, an "in conceit" enhancement can only be
added if a new information is filed and a new preliminary hearing is held. This amendment
process is fully consistent with the trial court's regular discretion to permit amendment of an

7

Subsection (2)(b) states:

If the ["in concert"] subscription is not included initially, the court may
subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the allegation he
committed the offense in concert with two or more persons, or if the court finds
the defendant has not otherwise been substantially prejudiced by the omission.
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information during trial or post-verdict. See Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d); Bell, 785 P.2d at 395.8
Therefore, section 76-3-203.1, reasonably construed, does not deny a preliminary hearing on
the "in concert" enhancement. Like Cheeney's due process challenges, Cheeney's complaint
about preliminary hearing denial therefore fails.
POINT TWO
SECTION 76-3-203.1 IS NOT VAGUE, PROPERLY
PRESERVES JUDICIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION, AND
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Cheeney next raises a due process "vagueness" challenge to section 76-3-203.1,
and argues that it grants too much discretion to the sentencing court. He also argues that the
"in concert" enhancement "interferes with sensitive First Amendment freedoms" (Br. of
Appellant at 23-30). His arguments lack merit.
A.

The Statute is Not Vague.
As Cheeney observes, a statute must be sufficiently clear to "give the person of

ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly." Groyned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). Cheeney admitted
in the trial court that subsection 76-3-203.1(4) gives adequate notice of the predicate offenses

8

Rule 4(d) states:

The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time
before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial
rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or
information may be amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as
to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the same set of facts.
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for which the "in concert" enhancement applies (R. 47, appendix II of this brief). On appeal,
he alleges two vagueness problems with other subsections.
Cheeney first argues that "in concert," is a "puzzling concept," particularly
since the parties with whom the defendant acts need not be identified or charged. See §§ 76-2203.1(l)(a), -(5)(b) (Br. of Appellant at 24-25). He did not make this argument in the trial
court (see R. 43-44, 47-48, appendix II). He does not argue "plain error" or "exceptional
circumstances" on appeal. Therefore, this part of Cheeney's "vagueness" argument is waived
(more precisely, defaulted) on appeal. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah
App. 1991).
Even if not waived, it strains credulity to suggest that "in conceit" and
"unidentified or uncharged other persons" are "puzzling" concepts. The enhancement statute
defines "in concert" by express incorporation of Utah's criminal party liability statute, in
subsection 76-3-203.l(l)(b); Cheeney does not contend that the party liability statute is vague.
Furthermore, in this case Cheeney's co-perpetrators were neither unidentified nor uncharged;
Cheeney himself identified them when he confessed to police, and both co-perpetrators were
charged (R. 8, 12). Therefore he has no complaint that the "in concert" enhancement was
vague as applied to him, because the "unidentified or uncharged" provision did not apply in
his case. In addition, because the meanings of "unidentified" and "uncharged" are selfevident, the "in concert" enhancement is not facially vague.
Cheeney's second "vagueness" contention is that the "in concert" enhancement
statute fails to reveal its true purpose. Based upon the statute's legislative history, described
earlier, Cheeney asserts that it "is intended to be enforced in select cases involving gangs and
20

is intended to target ganglords" (Br. of Appellant at 25). That assertion is without merit,
because the enhancement statute contains no reference to "gangs." It merely addresses "in
concert" crimes~a concept that, as just explained, puts normally intelligent persons on
adequate notice of the conditions that will trigger the enhancement. Because the statute is
unambiguous on its face, it is unnecessary and improper to use legislative history to interpret
it. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850 n.14 (Utah 1994). The statute plainly enhances
penalties for crimes committed "in concert" with others. Nothing more (and nothing less)
may be read into it.
B.

The Statute Legitimately Permits Limited Judicial Discretion in its
Application.
Cheeney next complains that the "in concert" enhancement "permits the judge

to apply or suspend application of the statute at whim" (Br. of Appellant at 27). In other
words, he asserts that the statute grants too much discretion to sentencing judges-even though
noncapital sentencing, by settled law, is a matter of broad discretion. State v. Peterson, 681
P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984). But reasonably read in its totality, the statute does not allow
sentencing by "whim."9 Under subsection 76-3-203.l(l)(a), a crime committed in concert
with two or more others is subject to the enhanced penalty; subsection (5)(c) makes the
enhancement contingent upon the "in concert" finding; and subsection (6)(a) provides that
notwithstanding such finding, the sentencing judge "may suspend" the enhancement "required
under this section," provided that he or she state the reasons therefor (emphasis added).

9

A "whim" is a "[p]assing fancy; an impulse or caprice." Black's*Law Dictionary
1431 (5th Ed. 1979).
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The foregoing statutory language actually cabins the sentencing judge's
discretion by creating a strong presumption that once the "in concert" condition is found to
exist, the enhancement will apply (it is "required"). The presumed enhancement can be
suspended only if the judge makes an articulated determination that the "interests of justice"
support suspension. (Any vagueness in the term "interests of justice" actually aids the
defendant, who may interpret it broadly to introduce whatever mitigating evidence he or she
believes should apply.) Once more, a single legislator's statement in debating the statute (Br.
of Appellant at 26) is unnecessary to the analysis. Based upon the plain statutory language,
the judge's "whim" has no play; instead, limited discretion is the rule.
There is, of course, no constitutional problem with this rule. Utah courts have
consistently rejected constitutional challenges to Utah's three-tiered minimum mandatory
sentence scheme for certain offenses. Under that scheme, the middle of the three available
punishments applies, unless the sentencing judge articulates reasons to impose the lowest or
the highest minimum mandatory term for the designated offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(6) (Supp. 1995); State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 912 (Utah 1988) (discretion is granted
under the three-tiered scheme); State v.Gerrish, 746 P.2d 762 (Utah 1987) (three-tiered
scheme is not vague). The similarly limited judicial discretion to impose the "in concert"
enhancement is therefore proper, both as applied to Cheeney and as a facial matter.10

10

In the trial court, Cheeney argued that section 76-3-203.1 "allows prosecutors
exceedingly broad authority to charge the gang enhancement. . ." (R. 44). On appeal, he
does not pursue that argument, which would in any event fail under Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985), State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 402 (Utah 1989), and State v. Geer,
765 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied, 113 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989) (all holding that so
long as probable cause exists, prosecutorial charging decisions are a matter of discretion).
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C.

The Statute Does Not Impair First Amendment Rights.
Cheeney finally makes the frivolous allegation that the "in concert"

enhancement infringes upon First Amendment "associational" right-that is, "the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. Const. Amend. I. The foregoing First Amendment text, by itself, defeats this claim. The
amendment permits "peaceable" assembly, not assembly to commit crimes. Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951).
To the extent Cheeney really alleges "overbreadth"~a claim related to
vagueness, see Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 928--his allegation also fails. A statute is overbroad
if it proscribes (or could be understood to proscribe) a substantial amount of conduct that is
protected by the First Amendment, and thereby "chills" the exercise of First Amendment
rights. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984); State v. Murphy, 61A P.2d 1220,
1222 (Utah 1983). Section 76-3-203.1 does not proscribe any protected conduct, because it
cannot apply until the defendant is found guilty of a predicate criminal offense. Even then, the
enhancement does not apply merely because the defendant associates with a particular group of
persons. Cf. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S.

, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992) (membership in

racist organization, by itself, cannot be used as basis to enhance criminal penalty). Instead,
the enhancement only applies if the defendant acted with others who also "would be criminally
liable as parties" to the predicate offense, § 76-3-203.l(l)(b). In fact, by avoiding any effort
to criminalize "gang" association per se, the statute avoids any risk of outlawing protected
associational conduct. Therefore, Cheeney's First Amendment-based challenge, like his
"vagueness" and "excessive discretion" arguments, should be rejected.
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POINT THREE
CHEENEY CANNOT PROVE THAT SECTION 76-3-203.1
VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION OR "UNIFORM
OPERATION OF LAWS" PRINCIPLES
In his final point on appeal, Cheeney argues that section 76-3-203.1 violates
federal "equal protection" and state "uniform operation of laws" principles (Br. of Appellant
at 37-39). See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1; Utah Const. Art. I § 24. In the trial court,
Cheeney nominally alluded to these constitutional provisions (R. 43, appendix II of this brief).
However, he did not develop an argument under them. Therefore, his argument on appeal is
waived. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990).
Even if his appellate argument were preserved, it lacks merit. In large
measure, Cheeney's argument would fail because it relies upon false premises. For example,
he assumes that the enhancement statute applies without appropriate procedural safeguards,
and that it penalizes First Amendment associational rights (Br. of Appellant at 40). He
assumes that the statute is only intended to target "organized gang members" or to "get
ganglords off the streets" (id. at 41, 42). He assumes that the statute applies without a
preliminary hearing (id.). He assumes that the persons who commit the enumerated predicate
crimes have some kind of "liberty interest" against the "in concert" enhancement (Br. of
Appellant at 40). As already explained in this brief, all those assumptions are false.
The only new premise that would bear mention under this point is Cheeney's
claim that the class of persons created by operation of section 76-3-203-guilty defendants who
committed their crimes in concert with two or more others-is constitutionally "suspect." This
premise, for which Cheeney offers no supporting authority, appears frivolous. The class of
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"group criminals" certainly bears no resemblance to traditional "suspect classifications,"
defined by race or gender-classifications typically based upon a person's inherent
characteristics. Instead, the class is created by volitional, criminal behavior-which must be
established by legal process as already described in this brief.
Because no "suspect classification" is created by the statute, application of the
"in concert" sentence enhancement to class members need only rationally relate to a legitimate
state interest in order to be valid. State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 398-400 (Utah 1989). As
already explained, group crime causes more harm than solo crime. The State has a legitimate
interest in deterring the greater harm done by group crime. This interest is rationally served
by providing an enhanced penalty for group crime.
Finally, it might bear note that the differential sentence treatment between solo
criminals and those who commit crimes in conceit with others is not so dramatic as other
differential treatment that sometimes triggers judicial inquiry. As already explained, the "in
concert" enhancement does not expand the regular prescribed sentencing range for the
predicate offense(s). Neither the solo defendant nor the "in concert" defendant has any legally
cognizable expectation of leniency within that range. State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah
1981) ("there is no principle recognized in a court of law that one who would breach the law
is entitled to a free bite of the apple or to be treated leniently"). Thus the differing disposition
for the "in concert" enhancement and the non-enhanced sentence really does not warrant
intrusive equal protection or "uniform operation" review. Compare State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d
991, 998 (Utah 1995) (decision to prosecute juvenile defendant in juvenile or adult court
causes dramatic dispositional differences). Therefore, besides having been waived by trial
25

court default, Cheeney's equal protection challenge to Utah's "in concert" sentence
enhancement statute would fail on its merits.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Cheeney's enhanced sentences should be
AFFIRMED. A published opinion would be appropriate to dispel any doubt about the
constitutionality of section 76-3-203.1; the State does not request oral argument.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 02-day of April, 1996.
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APPENDIX I

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1
("In Concert" Sentence Enhancement)

76-3-203.1

CRIMINAL CODE

76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons
— Enhanced penalties.
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in concert
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense
as provided below.
(b) I n concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for
the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202.
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned,
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. The notice
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive
offense charged.
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include
the subscription if the courtfindsthe charging documents, including any
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or more persons,
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially
prejudiced by the omission.
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are:
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure
correctional facility.
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall
serve a minimum term of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure
correctional facility.
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison.
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison.
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison.
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed,
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years in
prison.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c,
regarding drug-related offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4;
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(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 766-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and
76-6-520;
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3, Title
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307,
76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in
Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses tinder Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety
Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act;
(u) communicationsfraudas defined in Section 76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002.
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an
enhanced penalty for the primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter
writtenfindingsof fact concerning the applicability of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence
required under this section if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the
record and in writing.
History: C1953,76-3-203.1, eiuicted by L.
1990, ch. 207,1 1; 1994, ch. 12,1 108.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-

xnent, effective May 2,1994, corrected the reference in Subsection (lXa).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Findings of fact
Mental ftat* of parties.
Findings of
fret.
Even though the trial court did not make
written findings offset concerning applicability

of the enhanced penalty as it was obliged to do
under this section, failure of defendant to object
to the enhancement precluded consideration of
the issue on appeal. State v. Labrum, 246 Utah
A r
* « * * * U (Utah Ct App. 1994).
Mental state of parties.
For this section to apply, a defendant must
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APPENDIX II

Cheeney's Trial Court Memorandum

REBECCA C. HYDE (6409)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

r..- c

ib^i
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO STRIKE
GANG ENHANCEMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY,

>
Case No. _9513J21£i)8FgJ
951901609F5

;iyui5ToFs c
Judge J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Defendant.

Comes now CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY, by and through counsel, REBECCA
HYDE, and hereby moves this Court to strike the gang enhancement
statute.

This motion is supported by the attached memorandum.

Respectfully submitted this /H

day of

September . 1995.

REBECCA C. HYDE
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the
foregoing motion to the Deputy District Attorney, at the Salt
Lake County District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, on the

day of

September

1995.

uOO

FILED 0SSTRECT COURT
Third Judicial District

REBECCA C. HYDE (6409)
Attorney for Attorney
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

SEP 1 5 1995
Deputy Cltrk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY,
Case No. 951901608FS
951901609FS
951901610FS
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Defendant,

FACTS
The Utah gang enhancement statute imposes
significantly increased minimum sentences for several specified
offenses, in cases wherein the offenses are committed by at least
three people acting as accomplices,
203.1.

Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-

A copy of the statute and the legislative history of the

statute is attached to this memo.
ARGUMENT
In State v. Blowers. 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986), the
Utah Supreme Court struck a statute purporting to apply the motor
vehicle code provisions to people riding animals on the roadways,
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because the statute violated state and federal constitutional
protections against vague penal laws.

Ld. at 1322-1323,

In

doing this, the Court explained,
Section 41-6-15 provides: "Every person
riding an animal or driving any animaldrawn vehicle upon a roadway is subject
to this chapter, except those provisions
which by their nature can have no
application." This is a classic example
of a criminal statute that is too vague
in its prohibitions to survive due
process challenge. It is impossible for
anyone to determine, even upon
thoughtful reflection, which portions of
the vehicle code the legislature thought
should apply to animals and animal-drawn
vehicles and which should not. In fact,
the very wording of the section suggests
that the legislature had no firm idea as
to what it meant. Section 41-6-14 does
not give anyone proper notice of the
conduct it intends to proscribe and
certainly does nothing to cure the
vagueness problems inherent in section
41-6-44.
Id. at 1323.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Howe wrote,
Due process of law requires that the
legislature provide sufficiently precise
standards to guide a judge and jury in
deciding whether a crime has been
committed. Failure to do so may well
constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power.

The power to define crimes is legislative in character; it
may not be delegated to the courts. A statute which
delegates legislative power to the judiciary violates a
constitutional mandate for separation of powers.
•«• •

It would certainly be dangerous if the
legislature could set a net large enough
to catch all possible offenders, and
leave it to the courts to step inside
and say who could be rightfully
detained, and who should be set at
large. This would, to some extent,
substitute the judicial for the
legislative department of the
government.

Id. at 1323-1324 (citations omitted.
As is discussed below, the gang enhancement statute is another
prime example of vague legislation, wherein the legislature has
delegated to courts the responsibility of deciding when this law
will apply.
The gang enhancement statute is unconstitutional in four main
respects: the statute fails to adequately channel prosecutorial
and judicial discretion; the statute fails to meet the
legislative purpose in a rational manner; the statute impinges on
various rights unique to criminal defendants; and the statute is
too vague to forewarn citizens about the criminal consequences of
their actions.
1. Vagueness - failure to channel prosecutorial and judicial
discretion
Due process of law requires the legislature to enact laws
which are sufficiently definite to confine the discretion of law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352

(1983).

Kolendar v.

Laws must be sufficiently narrow

in scope that police officers, prosecutors and judges are not
allowed to discriminate in their application.

E.g. Constitution

of Utah, Article I section 2, Article I section 24 (equal
protection, uniform operation of laws provisions).

Courts are

especially careful to scrutinize legislation which might impinge
on basic First Amendment freedoms such as freedom of speech,
rights to assembly and rights to association.

IcJ. See also

Constitution of Utah, Article I section 1 (defining similar but
different rights under Utah Constitution). Under Utah
Constitutional standards, it is extremely important for the

legislature to narrow the scope of criminal statutes, so that
laws do not delegate the legislative function to actors from
other government branches.

E.g. Constitution of Utah, Article V

section 1 (separation of powers provision).
The gang enhancement statute allows prosecutors exceedingly
broad authority to charge the gang enhancement because the
statute applies regardless of whether the parties other than the
defendant are even identified, let alone prosecuted
commensurately with the defendant.

Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-

203.1(5) (b).
The gang enhancement statute gives judges virtually unbridled
discretion to decide which enhanceable offenses are actually
punished under the enhancement, by allowing the suspension of the
gang enhancement if the judge finds that the interests of justice
are served thereby, and states findings on the record to such
effect.

Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203.1(6).

As is true of all vague laws, the vague provisions of the gang^enhancement statute can be used improperly by government actors
who might be consciously or subconsciously inclined to
discriminate against certain classes of individuals, or to
impinge upon citizens' rights to association, free speech, and
other related rights.
104, 108-109 (1972).

E.g. Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S.
Inasmuch as the courts are empowered to

protect those most vulnerable to governmental discrimination and
overreaching, see United States v. Carolene Products Company. 304
U.S. 144, 152-153 n.4 (1938), this Court should use its authority
to strike the gang enhancement statute.

000044

2. Due process - lack of rational relationship between law and
legislative goal
Under Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution,
legislation must meet the legislative purpose in a rational
manner.

State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988).

A review

of the legislative history of the gang enhancement statute
demonstrates that the legislature intentionally enacted statutory
language designed by its drafters to obfuscate the legislative
intent, and that the legislature included the broad judicial
discretion provision as the mechanism whereby the statute would
hopefully apply as intended.
The legislative purpose of the gang enhancement statute was to
deter hard core California gang members from migrating to Utah to
franchise crack cocaine.

Legislative history, at 1-9.

It is

readily apparent to anyone reading the language of the statute
that the actual applicability of the statute is far different
from that intended by the legislature.

Review of the legislative

history explains the discrepancy and highlights the
unconstitutionality of the provision.
The drafters of the statute omitted explicit reference to
gangs or the real purpose of the statute in the statutory
language, in hopes of avoiding constitutional challenges to the
statute.

Legislative history at 2-3, 8-9.

The legislative

history demonstrates that the legislature was counting on the
judiciary to apply the statute in a manner as to effectuate the
true legislative intent.

The legislators participating in the

debate on the statute indicated their concern that the gang
enhancement should only apply to true gang members, rather than
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to non-gang-related crimes involving multiple participants.

The

sponsor of the bill informed them that that concern was addressed
in the section of the statute giving total discretion to judges
on the applicability of the statute.

Legislative history at 6.

Because the gang enhancement statute does not meet the
legislative purpose in a rational manner, but in fact relies on
an unconstitutional judicial discretion provision to effectuate
legislative intent, this Court should strike the statute.
3. Impingement on rights of criminal defendants
The gang enhancement statute purports to allow for the
imposition of significant minimum terms of imprisonment for
specific criminal conduct, while explicitly evading numerous
standard constitutional rights of criminal defendants, including
the right to a preliminary hearing for a determination of
probable cause, e.g. Constitution of Utah, Article I section 13;
the right to a trial by jury, e.g. Constitution of Utah, Article
I section 12; and the right to a finding of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, e.g. United States Constitution, Amendment XIV.
The legislature should not be allowed to create such extreme
punitive consequences for criminal conduct, in circumvention of
these fundamental rights.
The fact that the legislature characterizes the statute as
creating "enhancements," rather than as defining offenses, Utah
Code Ann. section 76-3-203.1(5)(a), should not override
fundamental constitutional rights of criminal defendants.1
1

The Utah Supreme Court has already differed with
legislature's
characterization
of
the
provision
as
an
"enhancement." In State v. Alvarez. 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994) , the
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Section 76-3-203-1 purports to penalize stated criminal acts
combined with specified mental states, and as such, the statute
defines offenses. Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-101 et. seq.

See

also State v. Wedge, 652 P.2d 773, 777 (Or. 1982)(recognizing
that "enhancement" statute actually defined elements of a crime,
which should be assessed by a jury).

Because the statute

attempts to circumvent constitutional rights to preliminary
hearings, jury trials, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, this
Court should strike the statute.
4. Vagueness - lack of warning to citizens
Due process of law requires the legislature to enact laws
which are sufficiently clear to inform citizens about how to
conform their conduct to the law.

E.g. United States

Constitution, Amendment XIV; Grayned v. Citv of Rockford. 408
U.S. 104 (1972).
Cheeney concedes that the average citizen likely has knowledge
of the unlawful nature of the conduct encompassed in the offenses
subject to enhancement and listed under subsection (4). However,
the average citizen is unlikely to know whether the conduct at
issue is subject to such extreme sentencing enhancement because
the statute grants virtually unlimited discretion to the judge to
determine whether the enhancement applies.

See Utah Code Ann.

section 76-3-203.1(6) (allowing the judge to suspend the
application of the gang enhancement as long as the judge finds
that "the interests of justice would be best served" and states

court noted that the provision creates minimum mandatory sentences,
rather than true enhancements.

findings to this effect on the record).
The broad applicability of the enhancement compounds the risk
that the average citizen would have little forewarning as to the
applicability of the enhancement.

See Utah Code Ann. section 76-

3-203.1(5)(b) (the statute applies regardless of whether the
other person(s) acting in concert with the defendant "are not
identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of
those persons are charged with or convicted of a different or
lesser offense.").

The Utah appellate courts interpret the

statute as applying regardless of whether the parties share the
same mens rea.

State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994);

State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 905 n.9 (Utah App. 1994).

This

further promotes the possibility that someone could suffer the
consequences of the gang enhancement statute without fair
forewarning.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should strike Utah Code
Ann. section 76-3-203.1.
Respectfully submitted this f^j

day^of

September. 1995.

5E
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the
foregoing motion to the Deputy District Attorney, at the Salt
Lake County District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, on the

day of

September. 1995.
DELIVERED BY
SEP 1 5 1995
VIOADFR

APPENDIX III

Waiver of Preliminary Hearing

Page
3
AUGUST 31, 1995
8:46 AM
SLP Case: 951001082 FS
Agency No.: 94-141688
State Felony

RD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC
endant

THURSDAY

Citation:

CHEENEY, CHRISTOPHER

01/95 HRG DSP
scheduled for 8/22/95 at 2:00 P in room ? with SKM
PRE
on 8/ 3/95 was cancelled
L9/95 DEFT PLED NOT GUILTY.
22/95 DEVER/BR T 1900 C2600 DEFT NOT TRANSPORTED FROM THE PRISON AS
REQUESTED, CASE CONTINUED. REBECCA HYDE PRESENT ON BEHALF OF
THE DEFT, ROGER BLAYLOCK PRESENT ON BEHALF OF THE STATE.
PRISON NOTIFIED OF NEW DATE.
HRG DSP
scheduled for 8/29/95 at 2:00 P in room ? with SKM
59/95 Arraignment scheduled on April
07 , 1995 at 09:00 am
before Judge J. DENNIS FREDERICK in courtroom 503
Arraignment scheduled on September 08 , 1995 at 09:00 am
before Judge J. DENNIS FREDERICK in courtroom 503
DEVER/BR T 1908 C 210 DPW REBECCA HYDE, KEN UPDEGROVE PRESENT ON
BEHALF OF THE STATE.
DEFT WAIVED HIS PRELIMINARY HEARING,
THE STATE CONSENTING THERETO.
DEFT ADVISED OF HIS RIGHTS.
C/O DEFT BOUND OVER TO DISTRICT COURT.
DEFT IN PRISON.
DEFT ARRAIGNED AND WAIVED READING OF THE INFORMATION.
0/95 Judge ID changed from TPC to SKM
Entered case disposition of: Bound Over District
Chrg: 76 6-202 Find Bound Over District
Chrg; 76 6-404 Find Bound Over District
Chrg: 76-6 202 Find Bound Over District
Chrg: 76-6 404 Find Bound Over District
Chrg: 76-6 202 Find Bound Over District
Chrg: 76-6 404 Find Bound Over District
Chrg: 76-6 202 Find Bound Over District
Chrg: 76-6-404 Find Bound Over District
1/95 Case transferred to District Court.
Citation Amount:

ILR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR
BLR

:ional Case Data
Sentence Summary
L. BURGLARY
2. THEFT
J. BURGLARY
I. THEFT
>. BURGLARY
;. THEFT
'. BURGLARY
I. THEFT

Plea:
Plea:
Plea:
Plea:
Plea:
Plea:
Plea:
Plea:

Find
Find
Find
Find
Find
Find
Find
Find

Bound
Bound
Bound
Bound
Bound
Bound
Bound
Bound

Over
Over
Over
Over
Over
Over
Over
Over

Dist
Dist
Dist
Dist
Dist
Dist
Dist
Dist

!ase Disposition
DATE: 08/30/95
'arties
Atty for Plaintiff
UPDEGROVE, KENT
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REBECCA C. HYDE, (#6409)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT

MOTION TO CONTINUE
PRELIMINARY HEARING

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 941022189FS,
951000404FS and 951001082FS

CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY,

JUDGE SHEILA K. MCCLEVE

Defendant.

The defendant, CHRISTOPHER CHEENEY, by and through his
attorney, REBECCA C. HYDE, hereby moves the Court for a
continuance of the preliminary hearing, in the above-entitled
matter now set for August 3, 1995 at the hour of 2:00 p.m. on the
grounds that defendant anticipates a waiver and requests this
matter be set for disposition in two weeks.
DATED this

/

day of August, 1995.
Respectfully Si

REBECCA C. HYDE
Attorney for Defendant

STIPULATION
I , KEN UPDEGROVE, Deputy D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y ,

hereElMJudbalDistrict
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stipulates to the foregoing Motion to Continue Preliminary
Hearing in the above-entitled case.
DATED this //J^

day of August, 1995.

KEN UPDEGRO^
Deputy District Attorney

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion for Continuance
to the District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84111, this

(

day of August, 1995
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